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Contemporary agents of the East India Company claim that the organization 
stimulated development in the Indian sub-continent, but the formation of the 
Assam Company only benefited a certain proportion of the Indian population—
the urban elite. Establishing tea plantations in the countryside conversely 
impoverished the rural populations—this paper will explore the extent to which 
Company Rule, in particular the tea gardens and plantations of nineteenth-
century Assam and Bengal, impoverished and exploited the rural inhabitants of 
India, as well as pan-Indian laborers. These plantations followed the mold first set 
by the East India Company, and by contrasting their separate, but intertwined, 
histories, it is possible to posit wider questions about colonial rule, such as the 
large-scale subjugation of the Indian nation as a whole.  
After securing a commercial monopoly and relaxing taxes for Europeans 
in order to stimulate their economic progress, private British managers and 
producers enjoyed unchallenged power and free access to resources and labor—all 
under the approving eye of the Crown. These private businessmen created a rigid 
plantation-structure that dislodged the traditional Indian positions of authority 
and simultaneously extracted as much labor as possible from their workforce—
without substantial costs of production. Tea plantations achieved a high profit 
margin by means of coercive labor recruitment, low employee wages, an ethnic 
division of the work force, and inhumane living and working conditions—both 
on the plantations and in the surrounding villages. It is due to this pattern of 
economic exploitation that Company Rule on Indian tea plantations prevented 
local development and sustained an environment of colonial control in Assam and 
Bengal well into the twentieth century.
The East India Company developed as the primary trade company to advance 
British interests, and this umbrella business extracted Indian labor and resources. 
A more specific examination of the Assam Company, a descendent of the East 
India Company itself, reveals that the tea plantations of the nineteenth century 
were microcosms of larger political and economic issues that allowed the British 
traders and rulers to oppress the Indian people under Company Rule—the 
reverberations of which are still felt on the sub-continent to this day, evident in 
the widespread poverty and illiteracy of much of the population. 
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European powers oppressed India, keeping it as a colony until the nation finally gained independence in 1947. To this day, large portions of the 
Indian population remain poor and illiterate, and although the economy is 
growing on the whole, India has not been able to recognize its full potential 
since. One of the methods with which Great Britain prevented Indian 
development was through the East India Company; although colonialism 
brought transportation networks, new infrastructure, and education to 
privileged sections of the Indian population that resided in cites, entities 
such as the East India Company ultimately did more to impoverish—not 
benefit—rural India. The East India Company, and its later tea subsidiaries 
and conglomerates, extracted Indian resources and abused indigenous 
inhabitants. One of the most oppressive tea subsidiaries, the Assam Company, 
formed out of a merger with the Bengal Tea Association in 1840. Studying 
Company Rule through the history of the East India Company and the Assam 
Company serves as a vessel with which to address the larger historiographic 
issue of the drain enacted by the metropole: whereby European nations 
benefited economically, socially, and politically—all at the expense of their 
colonies. In particular, Assam and Bengal, two of the largest tea producing 
regions in India, demonstrate the ways in which Company Rule not only 
created a colonial economy of exploitation, but also perpetuated social and 
economic underdevelopment in India. 
By the 1880s, tea, once a symbol of upper class luxury, became the 
“cheapest and most widely used drink amongst the common people” in 
Europe.1 Tea first increased in popularity during the 1830s, and the demand 
for this product, especially in Great Britain, soared; the British public 
accounted for roughly 88% of all tea use, and their patterns of consumption 
boosted market expansion.2 Previously, Chinese tea dominated the world 
economy, but by 1888 Indian tea established itself as the chief product of 
European consumers.3 However, with this increase in demand came the 
formation of smaller entrepreneurial bodies such as the Assam Company, 
which essentially followed the exploitative practices that the East India 
Company had already established. The East India Company initiated a string 
of government-supported private entities that possessed sovereignty in Indian 
provinces from the eighteenth-century on. With the growth of the East 
India Company and the tea industry, other companies began to form; the 
similarities between these entities gives rise to the question: to what extent 
do the private tea gardens, under the direction of companies like the Assam 
Company, embody the ways in which Britain exploited India as a whole?
The tea plantations of Assam and Bengal illustrates how the government 
worked with the East India Company to destabilize and exploit the 
indigenous rural people, and on many levels, tea plantations can be viewed 
as microcosms of the East India Company itself, especially in terms of larger 
political and economic issues. Although Sen Sudipta argues “colonial rule in 
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India has often been studied from the perspective of the British Raj of the 
nineteenth century,” he laments that “there are relatively few studies that treat 
the period of Company rule as the initial and perhaps crucial phase of colonial 
expansion”;4 this claim underlines the fact that Crown Rule prefigured 
Company Rule, and the establishment of Company Rule paved the way for 
later oppression against the Indian people. 
The Assam Company united with the Bengal Tea Association on 
January 16, 18405, and this entity best illuminates the colonial abuses of tea 
plantations throughout Asia because Bengal and Assam became the world’s 
largest tea growing regions, due to the British system of exploitation there. 
More than any other conglomerate, the Assam Company displaced local 
rulers and established an economic monopoly by skewing taxes and land 
ownership opportunities in favor of British interest—similar to how the 
East India Company usurped traditional systems of power in other domains 
of trade. After Lord William Bentnick, aided by an Indian leader named 
Maniram Dewan, discovered indigenous tea in India in 1834, Company 
Rule utilized—and even intensified—existing exploitative practices.6 The 
Assam Company maintained a substantial profit level despite competition 
from Chinese tea by keeping labor costs down, implementing coercive tactics 
of labor recruitment, deepening ethnic cleavages to prevent unified dissent 
and group consciousness, and ignoring Indian economic development in 
favor of private British gains. Ultimately, tea companies in India, especially 
the Assam Company, drew upon tactics of the East India Company, but 
took these avaricious measures a step further and created their own systems 
of damage and abuse which locked the Indian sub-continent into a cycle of 
indebtedness for decades. The tea company rule of the nineteenth century 
mirrors the East India Company and reveals the practices and methods 
underlying colonial exploitation on a larger scale; such a study helps to explain 
why India continued to remain subjugated for decades after colonial rule 
formally ended. 
This paper details the oppressive practices and inequitable levying of taxes 
first instituted by the East India Company, as well as how this established 
an abusive model which tea companies later modified to achieve their own 
profits at the expense of local Indian inhabitants. Next, an exploration of the 
Assam Company, which epitomizes the larger characteristics of tea Company 
Rule in general, illuminates how plantations drew upon the East India Model 
in order to legitimize raising Indian taxes, sustaining oppressive conditions 
on the tea gardens, recruiting labor in order to divide their workforce, and 
subjugating neighboring towns and villages; in short, the Assam Company 
serves as a microcosm of colonial exploitation, displaying the practices of 
Company Rule, as well as how this system prevented Indian development. 
Finally, this paper alludes to a specific example of violent Indian reaction 
against the continued poverty, illiteracy, and oppression on tea estates, which, 
unfortunately, highlights the connection between the metropole’s colonial 
agenda and its adverse effects on India, even today. 
I. THE EAST INDIA COMPANy MODEL, A VESSEL FOR 
COLONIAL ExPLOITATION
William Pitt’s India Act of 1784 gave the “Crown the power of guiding the 
politics of India with as little means of corrupt influence as possible,” which, 
in effect, established a concrete link between the doings of the East India 
Company and the approval of the royal government. Because East India 
Company’s products were seen as “necessary returns for public funds and 
trust put into the joint stock…Parliament was responsible for raising the 
finances to pay for the settlement of trade in the East Indies. The Company 
was authorized by letters…under the royal seal of England to make requisite 
laws, constitutions, and ordinances,” and this ultimately awarded the 
Company sovereign authority in many Indian Provinces.7 Pitt’s Act did little, 
if anything, to ameliorate the fraud already rampant within the Company; in 
fact, “the India House became a synonym for corruption and faction,”8 and 
the Act created an apathetic environment in which the East India Company 
pursued its aims by any means—moral or otherwise.9
Following Pitt’s Act, “monopolies both lawful and questionable continued 
to exist...indigenous traders, brokers, and subordinates who had thrown in 
their lot with the Company Raj were busy adapting to a new regime”.10 
This new regime, under the auspices of the East India Company, served 
as a precedent for later tea plantations such as the Assam Company, and 
they granted indemnity to businessmen who utilized manipulation and 
profiteering. The activities of the East India Company encouraged a system 
of ‘black agents’ who “dislodged a range of Indian middlemen (usually known 
as dadni merchants) who had acted as brokers”.11 This process relocated the 
profits of indigenous merchants and traders and placed them into the hands 
of British entrepreneurs instead. Consequently, these private British traders 
fostered a corrupt environment of insider trading, which allowed them to 
accumulate personal wealth—two characteristics which later reappeared on 
tea plantations. The East India Company displayed another corrupt practice 
which later distinguished the tea gardens of Bengal and Assam: British 
merchants seized power from local Mughal emperors by offering an annual 
tribute, or bribe, if the Mughals revoked the obligatory revenue payments on 
commodity goods; this eliminated European taxes and paved the way for later 
inequitable laws, such as the Waste Land Grant Rules of 1838, and led to 
Indian oppression.12 The East India Company “set the tone for the expansion 
of British and European colonies and economic interests in Asia and the rest 
of the world,”13 and one can argue that it laid the groundwork for a powerful 
intrusive state which tea companies later utilized as their model. The East 
India Company, approved by the government, created a climate of British 
dominance that tea plantations used as their basis for subsequent exploitation. 
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II. THE ASSAM COMPANy, A MICROCOSM OF ECONOMIC 
ExPLOITATION UNDER COLONIAL RULE
The expansion of the East India Company occurred because the Company 
“assumed sole authority to impose customs duties”14 and created customs 
houses that expanded revenue, while simultaneously supplanting traditional 
Indian trading authorities. The Company explored new realms of agriculture 
and commerce, and following the increase in worldwide tea consumption 
during the 1830s, a group of British merchants formed the Assam Company 
in London on February 12, 1839.15 In order to create a profit in light of 
strong Chinese competition, the Assam Company’s main objective was to 
acquire an economic monopoly in the tea industry. The Company petitioned 
the government to relax tax payments, and by 1854 the Waste Land Rules—
first enacted in 1838 to allow government-granted land to be free of revenue 
for twenty years—was in full swing and led to a rapid increase in British 
cultivation.16 Later acts, such as the Fee Simple Rules of 1862, the Revised 
Fee Simple Rules of 1874, and the New Lease Rules of 1876, further enabled 
“British planters to own large tracts of the most fertile land of Assam at highly 
concessional rates”.17 These legislations, which directly stemmed from the 
East India Company’s customs houses, displaced indigenous inhabitants 
and discriminated against aspiring Indian planters. Due to the nature of 
colonial capitalism, “only entrepreneurs with huge capital could take up tea-
cultivation. Difficulties for the indigenous entrepreneurs were thus increased 
during a nearly three-decade period, initially by the government, and later 
by the government and the planters in conjunction,” further alienating local 
traders and aspiring Indian businessmen.18
These acts marginalized the Indian people—from traders, to laborers, to 
peasants. The Assam Company squatted on “as much land as possible to pre-
empt any future rival,”19 and only one half of land was actually cultivated for 
tea, while the other half remained “set aside for future expansion”.20 What 
little land remained was out of reach of the local population, literally and 
figuratively, because only those with a large amount of capital could risk tea 
cultivation. In addition, while British evaded taxation, Indian landowners paid 
two rupees per acre to their British masters.21 The peasants who were not 
coerced into working in the plantation sector remained “largely subsistence 
oriented” and “the bulk…impoverished as a result of rack-renting and 
usurious practices of money-lending, [they] did not possess enough capital to 
invest it in land reclamation in the district”.22 Indians who did not work for 
the tea gardens became impoverished, due to discriminatory land taxes and 
duplicitous British loans.
Further, Company Rule maintained its economic hegemony through 
violent means as well. The Company took no chances with local competition, 
and “aspiring Assamese planters were discriminated against and discouraged 
from entering into competition with the British planters”.23 Maniram 
Dewan, the Indian leader who had first alerted the British of the presence of 
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indigenous tea, resigned from his post with the Assam Tea Company in order 
to create his own plantation. However, his land was maliciously classified as 
ordinary rice-property and, therefore, subject to very high revenue, which 
ultimately discouraged his success and bankrupted his plantation.24 When 
Dewan, a threat to British profits as well as a rival businessman, continued 
to excel, the Assam Company alleged that he was inciting rebellion; the 
Company’s false allegations consequently enabled the government to execute 
him in 1858. Following his death, the Company confiscated his land for their 
own possession, illustrating the full extent of British corruption.25 Dewan’s 
execution also reveals the lengths to which British planters of Company Rule 
went in order to sustain complete control of the Assamese and Bengali tea 
trade. 
As with the East India Company before it, the British monarchy endorsed 
the Assam Company and displayed support by transferring two-thirds of 
government-owned tea stations to the Company in February of 1840.26 The 
Company flourished in this favorable environment, and used this opportunity 
to tie down laborers to plantations vis-à-vis subsistence farming, which not 
only prevented competition in the sphere of commercial agriculture, but also 
made the Indian people “dependent upon their employers for every necessity 
of life”.27 Tea estates distributed “a bulk of…surplus land…into small plots 
to be distributed among the laborers,”28 but these plots forced Indians 
who bought land into a crushing cycle of debt and dependence. It chained 
peasants to uncultivated land “by further exploitation of his and his family’s 
labour,”29 which was necessary to pay off taxes and loans, and it gave rise to 
“a dampening effect on the propensity of the different categories of peasants 
to take the risks involved in commercial agriculture”.30 Coupled with this 
need to cultivate their own subsistence crops, Indian laborers found that the 
price of necessary goods in the market increased, while their wages remained 
injudiciously low.31 Many of these peasants turned to plantation labor because 
when the British gained control of tax revenues in the 1770s, Indian taxation 
increased; labor became the only way they could pay their taxes. This caused 
peasants to “quit the land…indebtedness and expropriation from land of the 
small peasants created a favorable environment for the [British] planters,” and 
the cycle became so severe that many Indians pawned their own freedom as 
a last resort.32 Measures such as these, undertaken by the Assam Company 
and individual tea plantations, prevented local competition from profiting, 
and severely compromised the development of the Indian people and their 
economy. 
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III. SPECIFIC ExPLOITATIVE MEASURES OF THE ASSAM 
COMPANy—LABOR, RECRUITMENT, AND PRIVATE TRADE
Perhaps the most gripping example of the exploitation of indigenous peoples 
under Company Rule occurred within the realm of labor recruitment. Because 
of market competition from Chinese tea, the Assam Company sought to 
keep all investments, especially labor costs, as low as possible in order to 
increase profit and remain competitive. There was little, if any, mechanization 
within the tea plantations, so labor was “the main element in the total cost 
of production of tea;”33 therefore, the less that companies spent on labor, 
the higher their personal margin of profit would be. In the formative years 
of Company Rule, tea gardens created and sustained a hierarchal plantation 
structure in which labor was acquired through an indenture system, 
characterized by “mobilization of a large unskilled labour force through 
non-market mechanism, low wages, extra-legal methods of control and 
large scale production through labour-intensive, low-skill methods”.34 This 
hierarchy, characterized by a small number of British managers and a large 
class of oppressed Indian workers, could not function without force. To 
combat the high rate of absconding laborers, the Company enforced “strict 
control through penal laws, floggings illegal confinements, and the chowkidari 
system,”35 a system in which the British employed watchmen and guard dogs 
to prevent desertion and disobedience.36 This example reinforces how British 
tea companies cut costs and exploited their workforce, which in turn led to an 
increase of disease, malnutrition, and mortality. During one extreme instance, 
the British even prohibited laborers from producing rice, the main subsistence 
crop for the Indian people, because it was “opposed to the interest of the 
Company”37 and ‘interfered’ with tea profits.
In order to guarantee that the workforce was productive, entities such as 
the Assam Company constructed false narratives against local laborers and 
“raised a hue and cry about local labour due to the alleged unwillingness of 
Assamese agricultural laborers to work in tea gardens”.38 British entrepreneurs 
ignored the favorable balance of indigenous inhabitants and land, as ignored 
the fact that the fertile soil allowed peasants to grow rice with little effort or 
capital—reasons which, if acknowledged, would have explained why local 
people were not interested in working on the plantations.39 It is because 
of these factors that Assamese and Bengali inhabitants had little incentive 
to tea cultivators, a labor-intensive occupation. In addition, tea companies 
offered arbitrarily low wages and only a “substantial monetary inducement” 
would have caused Indian people to voluntarily labor in tea gardens.40 No 
such monetary inducement existed, and government works such as railroad 
production offered higher wages—thus attracting local labor more easily.
Because the Bengali and Assamese inhabitants did not willingly seek 
employment with them, tea companies therefore dismissed indigenous people 
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as lazy. A civil servant in Bengal during this period wrote: “the village folk do 
not, as a rule, work harder than they are compelled to do…so long as their 
urgent wants are satisfied they do not care to exert themselves…they do no 
more than they must”.41 Because of this discriminating narrative against local 
peoples, planters coerced laborers from other regions, and ultimately produced 
a system of neo-slavery that ensnared workers from vast distances throughout 
the entire sub-continent. 
Recruiting labor from foreign districts solved many issues, especially 
because tea companies considered local labor to be “expensive and risky”42; for 
one, local laborers were more likely to protest poor conditions and garner the 
support of the neighboring villages. To prevent this type of unrest, companies 
sought labor from far distances. Unlike local labor, immigrant workers were 
easier for plantations to control because they could not “trek back home 
whenever they had reason to be dissatisfied with the Company”.43 Immigrant 
laborers could be “exploited and ill-treated without much impact on the 
surrounding villages,” and therefore, tea companies preferred their labor.44 
The Assam Company further claimed that immigrant laborers from regions 
such as Bhagalpore, Chittagong, and Dacca were “physically stronger than the 
weak Benglaies” and more capable of “understanding hard work in the jungle;” 
therefore, they were “better suited to the unhealthy climate of the districts of 
Assam”.45 In actuality, many foreign workers, such as Bengali Muslims, 
could not survive the Assamese climate, and the foreign worker mortality rate 
reached 35 per cent on the plantations.46 These foreign laborers, derogatorily 
referred to as “hill coolies, dhangar and boonah (jungle-dwelling),”47 were 
easier to exploit than local people and companies could keep them illiterate, 
and therefore ignorant of their rights.48 Tea companies coerced aboriginal 
laborers from tribes and lower castes, and because they constituted the lowest 
position, socially inferior to even the bottom caste,49 tea managers exploited 
this vulnerability and reduced them to the “private property,” or slaves, of the 
Company.50
Because Company Rule sought to keep labor costs as low as possible, it 
was necessary to coerce foreign laborers in light of such low wages. Potential 
workers from alien districts had little incentive to travel far distances to 
the plantations because the “sufferings and high death rates were common 
knowledge…and further efforts to procure a fresh supply [of laborers] proved 
to be increasingly unsuccessful;”51 consequently, importing labor necessitated 
an intensive recruiting network. Sardari recruitment developed to forcibly 
entice workers from distant regions, and bribery and trickery characterized 
it. Sadars, natives trusted by British companies to appeal to the indigenous 
people, worked as intermediaries and registered laborers in districts far from 
their home.52 Similar to sadars, native arkatis served as middlemen because 
they knew how to induce their peers to become laborers. They used both “fair 
means and foul” to secure peasant labor for tea companies.53 Ultimately, the 
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combined effort of the British planters and their labor recruiters created a 
deceitful system, which caused peasants throughout India to surrender their 
lands and resign themselves to kamiouti, or forced labor, because they believed 
they had no other option.54 
Companies hired contractors based on commission, and as a result, these 
labor recruiters cared more for the amount of laborers they supplied than for 
the wellbeing of these workers.55 Consequently, “mortality of coolies on the 
voyage up between 1861 and 1863 was caused by overcrowding, insufficient 
and improper food supplied on the voyage and total neglect of the coolies both 
as regards to medical treatment and cleanliness;” sadly, overcrowding became 
so excessive that people were crushed in transit, before they even arrived on 
a tea plantation.56 Conditions on vessels transporting laborers, as well as 
accommodations of the plantations themselves, were unclean; they increased 
the probability of diseases such as cholera.57 After the British government 
passed Act III in 1863, which officially licensed and ‘regulated’ the recruiting 
system, recruitment activity increased. The mortality rate in every shipment of 
alien laborers approached 50 percent as a result, and companies “shipped them 
[the recruits] as if they were cattle,” thus transforming the tea laborer “into a 
commodity and a virtual slave”.58
Another negative ramification of labor recruitment occurred because tea 
plantations introduced and reinforced ethnic divides. Companies purposefully 
imported an mélange of ethnic and religious groups so that workers’ struggles 
could not “crystallise into a unified and organized labour movement in the 
Assam Valley”.59 Once on a plantation, workers could not unite because 
people “coming from a distant and scattered area were less powerful,” and 
therefore, less cohesive.60 Colonial capitalism deepened “ethnic cleavages 
among the mass of the plantation labourers, brought about ethnic and class 
solidarity among the managerial and intermediary class,” while the laborers 
remained strictly divided by ethnicity, language, and religion.61 This practice 
reflected the larger colonial trend of ‘divide and rule’ that bodies of British 
authority, such as the East India Company, commonly practiced during the 
nineteenth century.
Entities such as the Assam Company further prevented mass protest 
by isolating their divided workforce from the outside world. The Assam 
Company enacted measures of ‘discipline’ in various ways: “they [the laborers] 
were compelled to reside within the vicinity of the gardens; their mobility 
within and outside the plantations was severely restricted; they were isolated 
from the outside world; and they were made completely dependent on their 
employers”.62 The struggles that developed on the plantations remained 
isolated, and no links could emerge in such a detached climate. Laborers, both 
native and foreign to the Assam Valley, were not allowed to leave the estates, 
and chowkidars prevented them from contacting villagers nearby. Enforced 
isolation inhibited “the development of class consciousness…by maintaining 
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a strict physical control”.63 This gross exploitation reduced workers to the 
position of neo-slaves.64 
Just as private inland trade developed during the early years of the East 
India Company, the Company Rule of tea conglomerates, such as the Assam 
Company, encouraged private gain at the expense of local development. Inland 
trading “of salt and other status goods was considered a scene of the most 
tyrannic and oppressive conduct that was known in any age or country,”65 and 
this created a basis for exploitation in the realm of tea production later. Private 
tea managers reaped enormous profits and refused to invest in surrounding 
villages. During “the years of tea mania everybody was quietly busy making 
his own fortune”66 and private merchants established extravagant lifestyles for 
themselves—often in stark juxtaposition to the poverty that characterized the 
plantations and the neighboring villages. 
The real profit from these tea estates ended up in “the hands of the owners 
and managers in the form of profits or salary,” as they received a salary 
ten times the size of their common laborers.67 In this way, tea plantations 
mirrored greater exploitative trends of the East India Company as a whole—
especially because, as a result of these practices, North Bengal and the Assam 
Valley remained severely underdeveloped.68 Urban centers did spring up near 
plantations, but they catered mostly to the needs of the tea gardens and “failed 
to grow into viable trade and commercial centers” for local people.69 Although 
a member of the British civil service claimed that “the Charter Act of 1813 
directed that out of the annual surplus revenues of British India ‘a sum of not 
less than one lakh of rupees’ should be set apart and applied to ‘the revival 
and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives 
of India,”70 the overwhelming majority of the profits from Assam gardens 
actually “enriched Britain and benefited British citizens”.71 British planters 
did not invest in charitable organizations or state development, and preferred 
to hoard their profits. Tea companies, supported by the British government, 
utilized exploitative means, just as the East India Company furthered 
European interests at the expense of the non-Western indigenous population. 
IV: MICROCOSM OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANy 
ECONOMIC MODEL—WHy IT MATTERS
The Company Rule of tea estates, such as the Assam Company in 
both Assam and Bengal, illustrates the East India Company’s corruption 
on a smaller, more specific level—yet it further reveals the oppression of 
colonial powers throughout the world. Due to “a high level of demand for 
Indian tea, weakness of competition from other foreign or Indian planters, 
a very low price of land for gardens, a low requirement of initial capital 
investment, cheap labour, elementary technical requirement and public 
patronage,” tea companies were able to thrive economically and to oppress 
the people of India.72 After the discovery of indigenous tea in India in 1834, 
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the Assam Company created and controlled plantations in the regions of 
Bengal and Assam that microcosmically resembled the exploitative practices 
of the East India Company, and by extension, colonial rule as a whole. 
These tea gardens instituted an economic monopoly of land, duties, and 
trade; displaced traditional middlemen; and discriminated against aspiring 
indigenous planters. As a result of this monopoly, Company Rule locked 
Indian laborers into a cycle of indebtedness and introduced ethnic cleavages, 
by means of foreign recruitment, which prevented protest and the formation 
of class-consciousness. The lack of class-consciousness ultimately enabled the 
atrocious living and working conditions on tea plantations, and prevented 
the economic and social development of the Indian people. Company Rule 
became just one example of the colonial drain—the drain which subjugated 
non-European colonies for centuries. 
Today, the colonial legacy of tea plantations and of the Assam Company 
lives on. In 1987, “out of about 620 tea gardens in the Brahmaputra Valley, 
only about 158 are owned by Assamese planters. However, most of these 
gardens are small in size…and many do not even have their own factories”.73 
Current British planters maintained the hegemony that their ancestors 
forcibly established during Company Rule until very recently, and to this 
day, they retain a large amount of plantation ownership. As time progresses, 
more Indian people have become plantation owners and managers. However, 
even with this trend towards Indian control of the tea sector, many Indian 
management executives retain the tools and techniques of the British 
colonial model and continue to oppress their rural workers.  On May 30, 
2003, incensed workers on a tea estate in Assam bunt set fire to their deputy 
manager because oppression still rages on, and all other forms of protest 
have not attracted attention or improved conditions.74 Extreme examples of 
protest such as this murder highlight why it is important to study the colonial 
period of Company Rule during the nineteenth-century in Assam and Bengal; 
because tea plantations fostered an environment conducive to the violation of 
human rights, the industry has been able to exploit Indian workers for over 
two hundred years. Because “the legacy of the colonial days has been cherished 
and nourished consciously in the gardens even half a century after the end of 
the raj,”75 it is imperative to study this period critically and analytically, so 
that society can find a way to end the exploitation that continues to subjugate 
India. 
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